Citizens, due to a lack of participation in public decision-making, often exercise 'counterpower' when a decision is taken, which can result in delaying or abandoning public projects. This could have been prevented if power and counterpower had negotiated during the decision-making process. Democratic Evaluation brings such a simultaneous exercise of power and counterpower to public decision-making. The evaluation method that we are proposing must enable a democratic type of evaluation to be made operational. Our aim is to demonstrate that the implementation of Democratic Evaluation is only conceivable when Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation and Multicriteria Evaluation are associated and considered as stages in the same evaluation process. This constitutes what we call a 'Model for the Operationalization of Democratic Evaluation' (MODE).
Introduction
Since the 1970s, more and more user groups have emerged so that the general public can be heard and participate in a more systematic way in the determination of public policy. In the beginning, these diverse manifestations seemed to have arisen from the lack of a counterpower and the desire of the population to have its say in public decision-making.
Public decision-makers often favour increased participation in decision-making, believing that this reinforces public support for their actions and limits the subsequent expression of negative counterpower which could prevent implementation. Thus, the principle of public participation in decision-making could enable us to re-balance the exercise of power and counterpower to meet the demands of increased control by the citizen of the public element and the demands for efficiency of the public services.
On the one hand, by encouraging the use of a counterpower and, on the other hand, by limiting its effects, the principle of an increased participation of the population in decision-making is welcomed by the general public and decision-maker alike, even though they may not always see things in the same light. The question is therefore whether given developments over the last 25 years there is now an excess or lack of counterpower.
We would argue that there is a lack of counterpower prior to decisions being taken and an excess of counterpower after decisions are made.
Agreement on the principle of increased public participation in decision-making has led to a new generation of evaluation methods which try to make the population part of the decision-making process such as Participatory Evaluation and Empowerment Evaluation. As attractive as it may seem, Democratic Evaluation (which includes Participatory Evaluation and Empowerment Evaluation) suffers from a lack of operating tools which thus limits its contribution to effective decisions. Our aim is to demonstrate that Democratic Evaluation can only be operational when Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation and Multicriteria Evaluation are associated and considered as stages in the same evaluation process. These are the elements that make up what we call a 'Model for the Operationalization of Democratic Evaluation' (MODE). Multicriteria Decision Aid Method in particular seems to be a tool in negotiation and an aid to decision-making which guarantees the coherence and operational nature of Democratic Evaluation.
First, we differentiate between Democratic Evaluation and Administrative Evaluation, while paying special attention to the simultaneous exercise of power and counterpower which enables the use of Democratic Evaluation. Secondly, we present the three stages of Democratic Evaluation: Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation and Multicriteria Evaluation.
Democratic Evaluation: Implementation of the Principle of Public Participation in Decision-making
While during periods of great economic expansion our societies have attempted to build a social order independent of economic cycles, in periods of economic difficulty we rediscover the insurmountable problem of resource constraints. New choices must be made at the heart of public services. Budgetary restriction per se leads to greater rationalization in the allocation of public resources. For example, since 1990, any new European structural fund project, whether at European, state or regional level, must be able to show through an ex-ante evaluation that the advantages are consistent with the funds expended (Conseil Scientifique de l'Evaluation, 1991). The ex-post efficiency evaluation of public services is also becoming more systematic. The new conditions for the distribution of public resources in fact increase the demand for evaluations at all points in time: ex-ante as a tool in decision-making, or ex-post as a tool in the critical analysis of the modes of organization and use of resources.
Budgetary limits, which are imposed in public decision-making, lead to a modification of the object and nature of policy choices. Future public decisions are more likely to be a choice in a same domain between alternative policies (e.g. between two public health service policies) or between policies from different domains (e.g. a choice between a social or economic policy: choosing between whether to build a hospital or a motorway) rather than a choice between alternative technical solutions (e.g. for a health service, the choice between several therapeutic alternatives). Future public decision-
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making may also be of a more collective rather than individual nature. By making us choose between different types of public policies, the relative rarity of public funds causes a breakdown of the consensus which existed beforehand about public policy objectives. We therefore no longer only face a tactical problem, that of finding the best possible way to realize a given objective. The question is now of a strategic nature: are the former objectives of public policy a good thing? This question reveals the identity crisis society is now going through. By questioning the objectives of public policies, we also question the values represented by the public policy in question (Ewald, 1986) . The object of our questioning is no longer purely technical (a choice between different means of fulfilment), but rather one of identity (a choice between the values that policies can mobilize) (Plottu, 1996) . This shift in basic questions is evident throughout the evolution of the conception of public policy evaluation.
Whether inspired by the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS), applied in the US from 1965 onwards, or by the Rationalization of Budgetary Choices (RBC) developed in France in the 1970s, the first response often depended on an administrative conception of evaluation (Guba and Lincoln, 1989) . According to this conception, the resources of an organization must be used as effectively as possible in order to achieve its aim. This main concern often went along with that of improving the implementation of public policies. After the relative failure of PPBS and RBC, a new generation of evaluation methods developed in reply to the growing concern on the part of public decision-makers to have their action legitimized by the target groups of policies as well as by the public and tax-paying electorate. The needs of users or beneficiaries have to be taken into account more widely, particularly the disaffected. Such a conception of evaluation fulfils the need for transparency in the use of public funds, transparency being at the base of democratic discussion. It is also influenced by the considerations of the State to find a solution to conflicts which may occur after public decisions are made and which might delay or put a stop to the implementation of public projects.
We can put forward three motives which justify resorting to Democratic Evaluation:
(1) An 'ideological' motive: Democratic Evaluation attempts to answer questions about values by questioning policy objectives. By allowing citizens to participate in public decision-making through thematic evaluation groups, commissions or pilot committees (many combinations are possible), it will be possible to consider their interests better ex-ante, as well as encourage them to consider their own system of values. This type of procedure questions individuals directly about their social preferences and aims to produce decisions which will conform to public expectations. The participation of citizens is a fundamental element of the procedure, as the latter have values which the procedure is trying to elucidate. The procedure also hopes to be egalitarian with elements of 'justice of a perfect procedure', as proposed by Rawls (1971) . This is a procedure with two dominant characteristics: the existence of independent criteria (that of equal participation for every citizen in decision-making) to define what a fair and just decision is, and the procedure itself (the principle of Democratic Evaluation) to guarantee that the result desired will be obtained (Gamel, 1991) .
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(2) A 'political' motive: Democratic Evaluation, a means of expression of popular choices, is also of interest to the public decision-maker. Be it ex-ante (at the emergence of public projects) or ex-post (at the implementation stage), Democratic Evaluation can be a strategic tool in the implementation of projects proposed by policy-makers. The fact that citizens take part in public decisionmaking gives politicians an opportunity to convey a positive image of the projects they support. This can encourage greater support for a project from the population and thus avoid conflicts which could arise subsequently because citizens do not necessarily agree with the project. Encouraging the development of participatory evaluation avoids the costs of conflicts. This brings us to the third motive. (3) A 'budgetary' motive: by encouraging the participation of the general public in decision-making and ex-ante consideration of their interests, Democratic Evaluation enables us to avoid conflicts which may arise ex-post and cost a great deal of money because of delays in project implementation. The additional cost incurred by the citizens' participation in decision-making, compared to 'purely administrative' decision-making (i.e. without consulting the population at all) needs to be compared to the cost 'avoided'.
Democratic Evaluation as described constitutes a strategy for the collection of data, quality control and the simultaneous exercise of power and counterpower (Floc'hlay, 1997) . The following diagrams illustrate the different stages in the decision-making process, the role played by each actor taking part in decision-making as well as the possible difficulties in the application of decisions.
In Administrative Evaluation (Figure 1 ), the structure of decision-making, in particular the projects submitted for evaluation, is given a priori. The approach to the decision comes from a pre-existing and substantive rationality. The evaluation phase involves the politician and the expert though their relationship is rarely stable. Either the appraisal appears merely as a guarantee for a purely political decision or the 
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decision is taken completely by the expert without entering into politics. The population is not made part of decision-making, although people may be called on to make a contribution. In an administrative conception of evaluation, there appears to be only one source of power. There is not, however, a lack in counterpower, but simply a time delay between the exercise of power (ex-ante) and that of the counterpower (expost). The counterpower is exercised during the actual implementation, being demonstrated by delays or even by questioning the validity of public projects. In France, we can cite the conflicts on the plans for new TGV lines or new motorways.
Democratic Evaluation ( Figure 2 ) allows citizens to take part in decision-making. The evaluation process becomes a negotiation process between the political decisionmaker, experts and the population. The structure of the problem of choice is not fixed a priori but evolves throughout the negotiation. Thus new projects (example, P5) can emerge while decisions are being made. Here, the approach to decisions comes from a procedural rationality. The evaluation/negotiation process must end in a consensus or compromise. Democratic Evaluation allows the simultaneous expression of power and counterpower so that implementing a decision will cause less opposition, counterpower having already been expressed.
Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation, Multicriteria Evaluation: The Three Elements of the 'Model for the Operationalization of Democratic Evaluation' (MODE)
Democratic Evaluation, as previously defined, has two essential characteristics:
(1) citizens' participation in decision-making, and, (2) decisions that are the result of a negotiation process. 
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To be effective, the public's participation in decision-making pre-supposes the existence of representatives (associations, interest groups, etc.) who would be reliable negotiators and representative of the interests of the general public. However, there are few public groups sufficiently organized to be able to take part in the negotiation process. Counterpower therefore seems to be unorganized, compared with structures such as trade unions and political parties and expresses itself in an isolated fashion without any real impact on decisions. Whilst the spontaneous creation of ex-post interest groups as the reactive expression of counterpower is frequent, the mobilization and federation of individuals is much more difficult ex-ante even though Democratic Evaluation supposes, from the beginning, the organization and structuring of counterpower. Empowerment Evaluation, 1 which aims to bring a population to the point of being able to evaluate and take charge of itself , is therefore the first indispensable stage in the efficient implementation of a Democratic Evaluation. It allows the emergence and structuring of a counterpower, through which the concerned public is able 'to speak with a single voice'. A second stage in Democratic Evaluation, which we call Participatory Evaluation is the negotiation process between public decision-makers (power) and the general public (counterpower), each seeking to protect their own interests through negotiation. A consensual solution, or at least a compromise, must be obtained through negotiation. The third phase of Democratic Evaluation-Multicriteria Evaluation-aims to render Participatory Evaluation operational by proposing a formal framework for the development of the negotiation and by encouraging decision-making (project selection process). There are a number of methods (Delphi, Abaque de Régnier, MACTOR, etc.) which can be used during the Empowerment Evaluation and Participatory Evaluation stages (Godet, 1991) . These methods are the true tools for the structuring of the problem of decision-making and the organization of the negotiation process. We particularly have in mind the use of the Abaque de Régnier for the Empowerment Evaluation stage and the MACTOR method (role play analysis) for the Participatory Evaluation stage. However, none of these methods really offers an algorithm which enables us to find a solution. Only the Multicriteria Decision Aid Method seems to be able to go beyond a formal framework for negotiation and provide an algorithm for a negotiated solution. It is therefore complementary to the Empowerment Evaluation and Participatory Evaluation stages.
In Figure 3 , we present the 'Model for the Operationalization of Democratic Evaluation' (MODE), which associates in one evaluation approach Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation and Multicriteria Evaluation.
It must be stressed that the operationalization of Democratic Evaluation is only possible if all the three stages of Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation and Multicriteria Evaluation are implemented. It would be unrealistic to imagine real participation from citizens in decision-making without a minimum amount of organization (role of Empowerment Evaluation). In the same way, citizens' participation in decision-making (which entails a negotiation process-the role of Participatory Evaluation) only has meaning if it results in a concrete decision, which is a possibility created by the Multicriteria Decision Aid Method. Along the same lines, each of the different stages (Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation and Multicriteria Evaluation) can only be justified if the other two stages have also been put into practice.
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The role of the evaluator in Democratic Evaluation, depending on the stage in the evaluation process, is to facilitate, coach (Empowerment Evaluation) and mediate (Participatory Evaluation) (Fetterman et al., 1996) .
The operationalization of Democratic Evaluation is ensured by implementing the three different strengths of the Democratic Evaluation process: Empowerment Evaluation conceived as a learning process about the evaluation experiment by the population; Participatory Evaluation conceived as a dynamic process of negotiation between the actors of the decision and the construction of the problem of choice; Multicriteria Evaluation conceived as an aid to decision-making allowing the Democratic Evaluation process to result in a selection and implementation of a solution to choice problems that arise.
From the public decision-maker's point of view, it is possible to distinguish two main areas of reservation about the implementation of Democratic Evaluation:
(1) Representative democracy assumes that the elected politician has the mandate to act on behalf of citizens. Encouraging Democratic Evaluation acknowledges that those elected are not able to fulfil their mission effectively. This can lead the elected politician to question his/her own legitimacy (2) There is fear that the confrontation of value systems will be expressed as an outand-out opposition of different points of view, blocking any possible negotiation between the actors, reinforcing their questions. This evokes fears of a breakdown situation, and questions how operational the negotiation process in decision-making really is.
Is there an approach to decision-support whose logical foundations are in accordance with the spirit of Democratic Evaluation and thus ensure its operationality? The conceptual interest of Democratic Evaluation and its attention to the current preoccupation of public decision-makers, in comparison with Administrative Evaluation, cannot Floc'hlay and Plottu: Democratic Evaluation hide a weakness: the lack of operationality of Participatory Evaluation, in comparison to Administrative Evaluation. The latter's logic is that of a traditional economic calculus whose operationality is ensured by cost-benefit analysis as a method in support of decision-making. Those who support Participatory Evaluation are often suspected of rejecting the very basis for evaluation (Stufflebeam, 1994) . Therefore, in Democratic Evaluation, we must dissipate these suspicions and demonstrate that it is operational.
Multicriteria Decision Aid Method: A Tool for the 'Model for the Operationalization of Democratic Evaluation' (MODE)
The Multicriteria Decision Aid Method (Bana e Costa, 1990) can ensure the operational aspect of a Democratic Evaluation and is thus an essential component of MODE. Indeed the multicriteria method seems to be a powerful tool in aiding both negotiation and decision-making (Fayat, 1993) . It therefore has two functions, that of a formal framework. The Multicriteria Decision Aid Method compared to more conventional methods of evaluation based on an administrative rationale allows us to consider quantitative and qualitative decision criteria without reducing the different points of view of the actors to one sole indicator (usually in monetary form). Multicriteria Evaluation Methods aim to recreate the different dimensions of the decision-making problem and the different opinions of the diverse actors. At this level, Multicriteria Evaluation and the principle of Democratic Evaluation take a 'constructive' point of view by refusing to consider the existence of one truth and by accepting the subjective nature of any evaluation. Recognizing the subjective nature of any value judgement and therefore distinguishing objective facts from value judgement is a necessary starting point in a negotiation conceived of as a dynamic process for the collective construction of a negotiated solution and not as a simple confrontation of interests. Multicriteria Evaluation 2 in its approach to decision-making seems to be a method which is well adapted to Democratic Evaluation.
We can point out several stages in the implementation of a Multicriteria Evaluation which we are presenting here within the framework of the ELECTRE I method (Roy, 1985 (Roy, , 1990 ):
Stage 1: Definition of potential actions (alternatives), e.g. rival projects. Stage 2: Elaboration of pertinent quantitative and qualitative criteria for decisionmaking. Stage 3: Evaluation of the performance of the alternatives for each criterion. In this way, we can obtain a table of performance (evaluation matrix). Stage 4: Participants in decision-making express the relative importance they give to each criterion for the decision (coefficients relating to importance). In this way, we can obtain a specific weighting of criteria for each participant. Stage 5: We can make an assumption: action i outperforms action j. We then try to confirm this assumption by comparing the performance of two actions against each criterion (pairwise comparison of alternatives). We can thus
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obtain the indication of concordance (assumption confirmed) and the indication of discordance (assumption not confirmed). Stage 6: In order to state that action i outperforms j, we can establish a minimum (threshold) level of confirmation to be attained and a maximum level of disconfirmation not to be exceeded. Stage 7: We can thus obtain a graph which shows the 'upgrading'. Let us note that we can obtain as many of these graphs as there are vectors of weights. In this way, it is possible to determine the projects which are consensual or the compromises which are acceptable to all the participants in the decision-making process. Stage 8: We can vary the parameters of the choice problem (levels of concordance, etc.) for a better definition of the recommendation and highlight the projects likely to bring the widest consensus (sensitivity analysis).
We will now present an example of a multicriteria approach to the problem of decisionmaking. This example has been inspired by work we carried out in 1993 using the Multicriteria Aid Method on the question of inter-municipal cooperation (Plottu, 1993) . This example will enable us to illustrate and clarify each stage of the multicriteria method presented above. This inter-municipal example is interesting for two reasons. First, it brings the different actors of the decision process together, each having potentially conflicting value systems. The decision will therefore be the result of a negotiation procedure between economic interests, politicians (local councillors) and the populace. Second, the elements necessary for the decision-making (choice criteria) are both quantitative and qualitative (political, financial and emotional motivations, etc.). These two characteristics can be found in numerous decisions about community facilities and amenities (TGV, motorways, etc.). We have previously highlighted the characteristics of Democratic Evaluation, i.e. the structure of the problem of choice is not fixed a priori but evolves through negotiation. Therefore, new projects can emerge while the decisions are being made. The following example illustrates this proposition. Contrary to traditional decision-making (predefined structure on the problem of choice), the original data on the problem (alternatives, criteria, actors in decision-making) in the multicriteria approach to decision-making only constitute the foundations on which the negotiation process between actors will be based. The problem of choice gradually builds, evolving with the negotiation process. As we will demonstrate in the example, the Multicriteria Decision Aid Method will not derive a solution from original options but will encourage the emergence of new ones.
The context of the study made
Faced with a large number of communes or communities (nearly 36,000), the French government has long encouraged the development of cooperation between them, particularly in the economic domain. Different formulas of inter-municipality exist, from selective cooperation on a given project between communities that remain independent, to the merging and creation of a supra-municipal entity (the sharing of the municipalities' resources and competence). The aim of our study was to help a certain number of rural communities to answer the question: have they anything to gain from 
The different stages of the Multicriteria Decision Aid Method
Stage 1: Definition of potential actions (alternatives). This stage consists of considering the different possible forms of cooperation in addition to the 'status quo' possibility (not to cooperate). To simplify this, we will present two forms:
(1) Alternative 'integration' denoted as 'INTEG' which implies the merging of the municipalities' resources and the creation of a supra-municipality structure run by a council which is financially autonomous. (2) Alternative 'cooperation' denoted as 'COOP' which allows selective cooperation on particular projects between communities which remain independent.
Together with the 'status quo' alternative denoted as 'STAQUO', we will thus be considering three options.
Stage 2: Elaboration of pertinent criteria for decision-making. The aim of this stage is to translate the different elements judged as pertinent by decision-makers into choice criteria in order to choose between the three options proposed. At this stage, the evaluator plays an important role, in particular:
• helping the decision-makers express the elements they deem important for choice, and, • translating these different elements into criteria that reflect the decision-maker's concerns.
In our example, three types of concern characterize the problem of decision-making for councillors, the population, and economic interests:
• impact as regards economic development • impact at the level of commune decision-making power, and • impact at a financial or tax level.
These three types of concerns are translated into the following criteria:
• the number of projects the structure can bear • the relative weight of the community within the structure (distribution of powers)
• the amount the State is willing to contribute to the structure.
Stage 3: Evaluation matrix. We are now able to consider the performance of three alternatives according to three criteria. We have decided to represent performance on an ordinal scale (Table 1) . In this way, we will give a score for performance from 'very bad' to 'very good' to each alternative on each criterion from 1 to 7.
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On this basis, we obtain the following evaluation matrix (Table 2) :
Understanding the table: the 'INTEG' alternative enables a certain number of economic projects to be implemented. It is relatively effective in this criterion. We can therefore give it a score of 6. 'INTEG' is far less effective in maintaining a balance in the way power is distributed and is therefore given a score of only 2. 'STAQUO' is less positively noted as a factor leading to further economic projects (score 2) even though it does preserve a distribution of powers between communities (score 7) and so on.
This evaluation matrix-to which we have added the weightings of the criteria by decision-makers, which is the object of the following stage-offers a synthetic overview of the problems in decision-making. This transparency in the outline of different elements enables the negotiation to start off on unambiguous grounds.
Stage 4: Weighting of criteria. For decision-makers, the criteria selected do not all have the same importance for decision-making. It is therefore necessary to attribute a relative weight to each criterion in order to reflect the relative importance given by the decision-maker to any particular criterion. The role of the evaluator is to help decisionmakers express their systems of values. There are many different weighting selection techniques. We have opted for the 'ratio questioning' technique which consists of establishing a link between the criteria based on their importance. In our example (Table 3) , the local councillors attributed four times more importance to the 'distribution of powers' than to the 'financial contributions'. Thus, the 'financial contributions' criterion represents a weight of 1 and 'distribution of powers' a weight of 4. In the same way, the 'economic projects' criterion is considered as twice as important as 'financial contributions' and only half as important as the 'distribution of powers' criterion.
The weightings reflect the system of values for each decision-maker. This exercise in weighting criteria obliges participants in decision-making to reveal their preferences. 
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Indeed, as each system of values is compared with alternatives and helps shape the eventual decision, participants are obliged to 'lay their cards on the table'.
Stage 5: Pairwise comparison of the alternatives. How can we determine whether one alternative is better than another? The answer to this question that follows from the multicriteria method lies not so much in finding the optimal alternative as it is in determining a good solution. The aim is to select a solution which appears to be relatively good according to some criteria, without being too 'bad' according to others. We are going to compare the alternatives, two by two. For this, we make the assumption that: alternative i outperforms alternative j. We will check the criteria on which this assumption is based, i.e. the score obtained by alternative i on a given criterion being at least as good as that obtained by j on the same criterion.
In our example, we will make the assumption that the 'INTEG' alternative outperforms the 'COOP' alternative. This assumption is confirmed for 'economic projects' and 'financial contributions' criteria, but not supported for the 'distribution of powers' criterion. Hence, we can establish a concordance index by adding the weights of the different criteria and by checking the assumptions made against the total sum of the different weights. Here, we therefore have (1 ϩ 2)/7 with the weight selection of the local councillors, (4 ϩ 1)/7 with the weight selection of the population, and (4 ϩ 2)/7 with the weight selection of the economic representatives. By repeating this 
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operation it is possible to create a table of concordance (Table 4 ) with respect to the weighting system of each actor.
In the same way, we can establish an index of 'discordance' when the assumption that 'INTEG' outperforms the 'COOP' alternative has not been confirmed. This is the case for the 'distribution of powers' criterion. In this case, the discordance index will be created as follows: by taking the difference between the marks given, which we then multiply by the weight of the criterion, we obtain a maximum result (to the extent that several discordance criteria exist), i.e. in the example given, (5 Ϫ 2) ϫ 4 for the weighting of local councillors, (5 Ϫ 2) ϫ 2 in the population's system of values, and (5 Ϫ 2) ϫ 1 in the local economic representatives' system of values. By repeating this operation, it is possible to create a discordance table (Table 5 ) with respect to the weighting of each participant.
Stage 6: Minimum level of concordance and maximum level of discordance. In order to state that one alternative outperforms another, the concordance level must attain a certain level without the discordance index going beyond a certain point. These discordance and concordance levels actually translate the demands of the decisionmaker (veto level) in defining the quality of the solution. In our example, we have chosen a concordance index (i c ) which must be superior or equal to 4/7 and a discordance index (i d ) which must be inferior or equal to 6: i c ≥ 4/7 and i d ≤ 6. When these two conditions both obtain, we can state that alternative i outclasses alternative j. Graphically, this becomes i→j. In a later stage, it would be possible to vary the levels of concordance and/or discordance, and see the effects on the upgrading graph (though sensitivity analysis has not been undertaken here).
Stage 7: Graph showing upgrading. In our example, we obtain three upgrading graphs which correspond to the three weighting systems (Figure 4) . Visibly, there is no consensus solution. Although the 'INTEG' alternative appears to be a good choice for the population and the economic representatives, it is not an acceptable solution for the Floc'hlay and Plottu: Democratic Evaluation local councillors. At this stage in the decision-making process, we might be tempted to acknowledge failure. In fact, the transparency of the multicriteria decision-making process enables each participant to have a better understanding of the opinions and system of values of the other participants. The framework proposed by the multicriteria approach is thus conducive to the generation of new negotiated solutions. In our example, it is evident that the obstacle to the choice of the 'INTEG' alternative derives from its weak performance on the 'distribution of powers' criterion. One solution to this problem would consist of broadening the inter-municipality cooperation zone to other communities, thus enabling a better distribution of powers. The negotiation procedure between the different participants in decision-making could thus be launched by the creation of new alternatives. The multicriteria approach to aid decision-making encourages research and the creation of innovative solutions by the participants themselves and the creation of new alternatives by ensuring the transparency of the negotiation procedure.
To come back to our example, the reflection which began on inter-municipal cooperation is relaunched by proposals for new forms of inter-municipal cooperation.
This example has enabled us to argue that the Multicriteria Decision Aid Method makes operational the principle of Democratic Evaluation:
• It offers a formal framework for negotiation by organizing and setting rules for the negotiation process (stages 1-8). It structures the negotiation process and facilitates its development once all the actors taking part in the negotiation have accepted the rules and are aware of the different stages of the process. Participants are obliged to reveal their own system of values (stage 4), if they want their opinion to influence the decision. Multicriteria evaluation as an aid in negotiation improves the transparency of the decision-making process.
• It enables power and counterpower to be exercised simultaneously; by transcribing the different opinions of the actors into quantitative and qualitative criteria (stage 2) and by establishing a vector of weights (coefficients of importance, stage 4) pertinent to each actor, multicriteria evaluation recreates actor rationales. In this way, the negotiation does not aim to discuss the systems of value but rather to define the solutions which are acceptable to all parties. The negotiation can therefore be cooperative in nature and encourage the search for new solutions. At this level, the decision-making process is based on deliberation, resulting from a procedural rationality. The negotiated solutions which can arise (stage 7-8) come from a procedural decision process (satisfaction) and not from one of optimization. Therefore, the existence of a veto level (level of concordance and discordance, . It is to be noted that the citizens' participation in decisionmaking (the simultaneous expression ex-ante of power/counterpower) should limit the risks of opposition ex-post to the implementation of the solution.
Within the framework of Democratic Evaluation, the decision therefore appears to be the result of the expression of power/counterpower in the dynamic process of negotiation. The Multicriteria Decision Aid Method provides a formal framework for the development of this Democratic Evaluation, by organizing the negotiation process and by making decision-making easier.
Conclusion
Democratic Evaluation is self-evidently a case of procedural rationality. The evaluation process and confrontation of actors' projects can be analysed as the progressive construction of the problem of choice. The final decision is thus the result of the evaluation/negotiation process. This approach to decision-making is particularly welladapted to choices involving uncertainty or choices demanding a questioning of values, as it allows the parameters of the problem of choice to evolve during the evaluation process. When there is uncertainty, decisions become more and more often political decisions, which implies heightened control by the population over public choice. The existence of a counterpower is fundamental in a democracy. The exercise of power and counterpower in the evaluation process therefore seems indispensable for decisions which concern the future of a given community. The increased participation of citizens in stages which are upstream to the decision-making process of its nature strengthens the legitimacy and acceptability of public action by the population. The elected decision-maker can thus hope that this participatory approach to decision-making will help avoid the financial and political costs linked to an ex-post expression of the counterpower (opposition on the part of the population to the implementation of public action). We have demonstrated that Democratic Evaluation allows the simultaneous exercise of power and counterpower in public decision-making, when used as part of the same evaluation process. The 'Model for the Operationalization of Democratic Evaluation' (MODE) that we have presented therefore recommends the association of these three types of evaluation within the same evaluation approach. The complementary aspects used within MODE, between Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation, Multicriteria Evaluation, enables Democratic Evaluation to find coherence and operationality, which it often lacked. It is not possible to disassociate the three components Empowerment Evaluation, Participatory Evaluation and Multicriteria Evaluation when demonstrating the operational aspect of Democratic Evaluation. If one of the links in the chain is broken, Democratic Evaluation is no longer operational. In the same way, putting one of the three evaluation methods into practice can only be justified when the other two types of evaluation are also present. Further research is, of course, necessary in order to improve the tools which are pertinent to each type of evaluation, while bearing in mind the complementary nature of these three
Floc'hlay and Plottu: Democratic Evaluation types of evaluation. The synergy thus created could contribute to the further development of Democratic Evaluation, worthwhile because ultimately the future operation of the principle of public participation in decision-making is at stake.
Notes

